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Glossary of Terms 
 
Accountability is being answerable to another person or organisation for decisions, 
behaviours and their consequences.1 
A Checklist is a list of things to be done, used as a reminder.  American surgeon, 
professor and writer Atul Gawande has written about 'The Checklist' as a tool to 
ensure consistency and completeness, while preventing mistakes and failure in 
accomplishing complex tasks involving a number of people.2   
Continuous improvement is an ongoing process of review against accepted 
standards undertaken to (a) eliminate waste and inefficiencies and (b) raise 
performance to produce quality outcomes.3 
Co-ordination is the synchronisation of people, activities and services to ensure that 
resources are used most efficiently and effectively in the pursuit of quality 
outcomes.  In the human services arena the focus of co-ordination is on meeting the 
needs of service users in the most efficient and effective way possible.4 
Human services are services that are publicly provided, funded or regulated with 
the purpose of promoting the well-being of citizens.  In this report the human 
services considered in detail are eldercare, end-of-life care, disability, schools and 
policing.  
Performance is the accomplishments of an organisation, service provider, 
programme or individual relative to stated goals and objectives, and/or pre-set 
standards.5 
Quality is the extent to which service delivery and/or service outcomes are free 
from deficiencies or significant variations, adhere to agreed standards, and meet 
with the defined needs and informed expectations of the service user.6  
Quality Service Review is a broad term for a set of processes and tools designed to 
review human services systems.  It is based on an in-depth case review method 
involving multiple stakeholders, and uses a performance-appraisal process to assess 
how service recipients benefit from services and how well service systems address 
their needs.7 
Regulation is a principle, rule or law designed to control or govern conduct.8 It is 
often defined as rule-making and rule enforcement.  It occurs when an external 
                                                          
 
1   This definition is derived from definitions of standards used by Health Information and Quality Authority 
(HIQA). 
2   Based on dictionary definition and Gawande (2010). 
3   Based on dictionary definitions. 
4  Based on dictionary definitions. 
5  Based on dictionary definitions 
6  This definition is derived from definitions used by the NESF (2007) and standard dictionary definitions. 
7  Based on work by Kershaw et. al., (2002) 
8   Based on dictionary definitions. 
VII 
 
agency imposes standards or rules on the behaviour and actions of others, which 
are accompanied by enforcement provisions.9 
Responsive Regulation is a theoretical model which asserts that regulatory 
interventions are more likely to succeed if they are responsive to the context, 
culture and conduct of the regulated organisations.  The model is encapsulated by a 
regulatory pyramid which demonstrates an attempt to solve the puzzle of when to 
punish and when to persuade.10 
Root-Cause Analysis is a type of problem-solving aimed at identifying the root 
causes of problems or incidents.  The practice of root-cause analysis is predicated 
on the belief that problems are best solved by attempting to address, correct or 
eliminate root causes, as opposed to merely addressing the immediately obvious 
symptoms.  Root-cause analysis is often viewed as an iterative process, and as a tool 
of continuous improvement.11 
Social regulation is a principle, rule or law designed to protect public interests and 
encourage behaviour deemed socially desirable in areas such as health, safety, 
welfare, working conditions, social cohesion, fairness and the environment.12 
A Standard is an explicit agreed measure by which quality is judged.  It sets out an 
expected or desired level of performance.13  
Standardisation is the process of establishing or complying with a standard.  It 
implies a degree of order, consistency and uniformity.14  In the context of this report 
it is associated with standardising upwards in a process of continuous improvement, 
rather than confining innovation.  
Total Quality Management (TQM) is a comprehensive and structured approach to 
organisational management that seeks to improve the quality of products and 
services through ongoing refinements in response to continuous feedback.15 
Triple-Loop Learning is an advanced system of structured reporting and shared 
learning.  The first loop of learning occurs when practitioners monitor their 
achievement and make adjustments to gain improved outcomes.  The second loop 
occurs when this kind of practical learning is noted by managers who subsequently 
adjust their systems and routines to take note of this.  And the third loop occurs 
when regulators and oversight authorities learn from monitoring the organisation's 
improved goals and revise their strategy for the entire field.16 
                                                          
 
9  Based on a definition by the Health and Social Care Regulatory Forum (2009:4). 
10  The model has been developed by Ayers and Braithwaite (1992).  The definition also draws on an interpretation 
by Koornneef (2010:6). 
11  Based on dictionary definitions. 
12  This definition is derived from a number of sources, including the OECD (1997:11), Sparrow (2000:7), and 
dictionary definitions.  
13  This definition is derived from definitions of standards used by the National Standards Authority and the Health 
Information and Quality Authority (HIQA).  
14  Based on dictionary definitions. 
15  Based on dictionary definitions. 
16   This definition is derived from Parker (2002). 
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The issue of progressing quality and standards in policing is often thought to involve 
a ‘strong’ regulator rooting out ‘bad apples’.  This report questions that assumption 
using the framework of responsive regulation developed in NESC Report No. 124.  
That overview report argued that quality is often achieved by regulators stimulating 
those whom they supervise to self-regulate and evaluate, and enlisting third-parties 
to add moral pressure and insight to this process.  This hypothesis is explored by 
examining how policing has been affected by the establishment of a range of 
oversight and consultative bodies in Ireland since 2005. 
A human service like policing is worth examining since its functioning is largely 
dictated by the discretion of individual officers which raises the question about how 
standards are maintained and improved.  In addition, quality in terms of policing has 
often been understood in terms of quantity–more personnel and more patrols–but 
now it is timely to ask if a service like policing can be delivered in a more nuanced 
way. 
This report first gives an overview of the structure of the garda organisation and 
then provides some context to the recent emergence of various oversight and 
consultative bodies within the field of policing.  It then details the functions of each 
of these organisations and examines the contribution that each of them has made 
to raising standards and contributing to improvements within Ireland’s policing 
service.  It asks whether the kind of oversight operated by these bodies is 
sufficiently ‘diagnostic’ to uncover the causes of the various complaints and 
problems uncovered and take adequate preventative action to prevent their 
reoccurrence.  The report also suggests that these bodies have yet to institutionalise 
procedures that would embed and sustain reform over time. 
The report then enquires whether a more promising route towards the 
advancement of standards is through a structured liaison process between gardaí 
and local communities and details how this has been accomplished in one area of 
Dublin city.  The report commends the work documented in this case study as 
enabling a more responsive and tailored police service; however it is difficult to 
render a final judgement about its efficacy since there is no benchmarking of its 
work against that of other similar operations conducted elsewhere. 
We do not know if there is a better way of policing with a community than that 
pursued by actors as detailed in the case study and this is because these kinds of 
review and subsequent revision of practice are not being undertaken either by 
management or oversight bodies.  Each level – local, corporate and regulatory – 
should influence and learn from the others by clarifying what constitutes quality 
policing and how it can be achieved.  Without this kind of system of learning, it is 
difficult to know if progress is being made in terms of a higher-quality service.  
Thanks to the policing reforms documented in this report, Ireland has all the ‘parts’ 
necessary for a well-functioning system of quality policing as suggested by the ideas 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY          X 
 
of responsive regulation.  But these parts have yet to be co-opted into a common 
regime of learning that is conducive to greater quality in policing.  Constructing such 
a system would help to prevent abuses of authority as well as meeting the policing 
needs of communities.   
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1.1 Introduction 
Policing is worth looking at, in the context of a project on the factors shaping quality 
and ongoing improvement in human-service provision, for a number of reasons. 
First, because it is an activity that is largely dictated by the professional discretion of 
the relevant actors, namely police officers. Even though, like all police organisations, 
An Garda Síochána is composed of a hierarchical structure, individual personnel still 
have a large degree of discretion in deciding what tasks to pursue and how this 
should be done. This degree of discretion raises questions about how standards 
within the garda organisation are maintained, evaluated and improved.  
The second reason why policing is worth examining in the context of a project on 
standards is that it is an area in which a number of organisations and units have 
been established, in recent times, to raise standards of policing or at the very least 
to ensure that they are not unduly lowered. Most of these have been introduced as 
a response to revelations about abuse of powers by individual officers in a specific 
locale. The net result of these changes has been to introduce a much greater degree 
of oversight of police activity. Questions remain about the overall impact of these 
new ‘oversight organisations’: are they having an effect on the overall level and 
quality of policing or do they only have an impact on the potentially egregious 
abuses of power?  
A third reason for looking at policing in the context of a project on securing quality 
in human services is that a quality police service has often been understood as 
being about maximising the number of personnel available. Both the public and the 
body politic have contributed to this tendency. The Head of the Garda Inspectorate 
noted this tendency as she reported that  
On the day I was appointed Chief Inspector of the Garda Síochána 
Inspectorate in May, 2006, a representative of the media asked me, 
‘Do we need more police in Ireland?’ I responded, ‘First, we need to 
consider what the police we have now are doing, particularly those on 
the front lines.’  (2009: 4). 
In a time of reduced resources, the issue of how police personnel and resources 
should best be used has become timely. A project on quality in human services can 
contribute to this debate by enquiring into the optimal way in which resources can 
be deployed to answer the concerns of the public. 
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This report on how to sustain improvements in policing is part of a series of NESC 
reports which is concerned with examining how the quality of human services can 
be maintained and advanced. In December 2011, NESC published the first report in 
the series entitled Quality and Standards in Human Services in Ireland: Overview of 
Concepts and Practice [hereafter referred to as the Overview report].  It provides a 
review of approaches to regulation, standards-setting, and continuous 
improvement: from a conceptual viewpoint, from international experience and 
from recent experience in Ireland.  Other reports which comprise this project 
review the role of standards and quality improvement initiatives in eldercare, end-
of-life care, disability and policing.  The project will culminate in the publication of a 
synthesis report drawing together the insights from all of the individual reports.   
The primary focus of the project is on what influences quality and ongoing 
improvement in human services provision, with an emphasis on the role of 
standards and systems of accountability.  Quality services have been defined as the 
extent to which service delivery and/or service outcomes meet the informed 
expectation and defined needs of the user (NESF, 2007: 3).  Human services 
provided in this way are often referred to as ‘person-centred’ services and services 
‘tailored’ to meet service users’ needs.  Associated issues that occur in a review of 
quality service provision and standards relate to regulation, especially responsive 
regulation; the role of the service user; how services are organised; costs; and 
systematic learning from experiment and experience (NESC, 2011). 
Since the Overview of Concepts and Practice report provides the context in which 
this report has been developed it is useful to provide a brief summary of the key 
issues and ideas which have emerged.  These will be used at a later stage to assess 
what arrangements are in place for the achievement of quality outcomes in policing 
and how well they are working. 
1.2 Responsive Regulation 
Regulation is one of a number of quality enhancing mechanisms which can improve 
the quality of services.  The concept of responsive regulation arises from studies 
indicating that regulation is not always effective when there are only two extreme 
options, which are ‘command and control’ (with rules and regulations implemented 
through a top-down approach directed by a central regulator), and ‘self-regulation’ 
(a bottom-up approach where service providers and professionals self-regulate).  
Responsive regulation instead aims to combine both approaches, and is often 
depicted as a regulatory pyramid of approaches, with self-regulation and voluntary 
approaches at the base and sanctions at the top (Braithwaite et al., 2007).  To 
ensure standards are met, the regulator or oversight organisation begins at the 
bottom of the pyramid with information provision and persuasion, but with the 
capacity to escalate towards punishment.  Regulators will seek to persuade, but will 
act further if matters do not improve.  Braithwaite has since developed a ‘strengths-
based’ pyramid, which promotes ‘virtue’, to complement the ‘regulatory’ pyramid, 
which restrains ‘vice’ (Braithwaite, 2008). This is similar to the distinction made by 
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Seddon who focuses on increasing purpose and performance in services rather than 
relying on compliance with regulations, and who sees front line staff heavily 
involved in driving improvements (Seddon, 2008).  
The Overview report uses the term ‘responsive regulation’ as a useful conceptual 
shorthand to encompass Braithwaite’s ideas and those inspired by him. It does so 
on the basis that responsive regulation refers not to one tightly coherent body of 
work but a loose collection animated by the idea that quality arises from a 
productive relationship between regulator and regulatee and the wider institutional 
environment in which this relationship is embedded.  
A range of approaches can be taken within responsive regulation, two of which are 
particularly relevant to this study of standards within policing.  One is meta-
regulation, where organisations establish systems of self-regulation themselves, and 
regulators then seek to assure themselves that these systems are adequate and 
being followed, i.e., it is the regulation of self-regulation (NESC, 2011).  This can be 
carried out within an overall guiding framework to promote quality.  The second is 
‘smart regulation’ (Gunningham & Grabosky, 1998), where a range of non-State 
bodies are involved in supporting regulation, for example, professional 
organisations, trade unions and NGOs.  These groups may be able to act as ‘quasi-
regulators’, for example, NGOs which provide supports to implement standards; 
although it may be necessary for the State to enforce such standards with 
organisations who do not respond to the persuasive work of the NGO or other third 
parties.  
1.3 Involvement of Service Users 
An increasing trend in the provision of human services is a focus on how the service 
user receives the service.  This means growing references to ‘person-centred’ 
services17,  and ‘tailored services’18.  There is greater emphasis on taking into 
account the views of service users not just for the sake of engagement but for 
understanding their issues and thus developing ideas about how solutions might be 
crafted. Involvement can take different forms such as consultation, ongoing 
engagement and, in some cases, the co-production of services and associated 
standards.  Associated with a greater emphasis on service users is an increasing 
focus on outcomes - for the service user, but also for the service providers, and the 
service system more widely (NESC, 2011). 
                                                          
 
17
  Person-centred services focus on the wishes of the service-user in relation to the kind of services received and 
how they are delivered.  This is the opposite of more ‘task-focused’ services that are often provided.  
18
  This refers to mainstream services which have supports specifically tailored to the needs of the person 
accessing them, so that the person can overcome obstacles arising from disadvantaged social circumstances. 
See also NESC’s report on the Developmental Welfare State (NESC, 2005). 
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1.4 Monitoring and Learning 
Seeking feedback on the delivery and quality of services is a vital element of all 
quality assurance systems and is key to continuous improvement.  What is needed 
is a mechanism for practitioners that enables them to learn from and revise their 
practice at a local service delivery level (NESC, 2011, Sabel, C.F., 1994).  According to 
Kendrick, monitoring and evaluation can point to the need for changes in service 
models: ‘They [quality and monitoring] are not in themselves capable of assuring 
quality, unless they are subsequently combined with feasible measures to improve 
service practice and models’ (Kendrick, 2006:3). A key message from all the 
evidence reviewed in the Overview report is the need for learning to take place at a 
number of levels that reinforce each other: the level at which the service is 
delivered; at corporate level; and at the level of regulator or at national level.  This 
approach is sometimes referred to as ‘triple-loop learning’.  Each of the loops is 
linked so that they system is not effective if one of the loops is absent or deficient.   
1.5 Devolution with Accountability 
Devolving responsibility to service providers to maintain quality, but with clear 
accountability mechanisms to ‘the centre’, can be an effective part of a regulatory 
system.  The evidence suggests that a fruitful approach is to set a broad regulatory 
framework or a small number of guiding principles ‘at the centre’19 and then 
devolve their application to the local context.  The centre continues to have an 
oversight role to ensure a quality service but local providers have the opportunity to 
improve services and performance.  The over-riding priority is on achieving and 
improving outcomes for service users (NESC, 2011). 
1.6 Cost Effectiveness 
In the current economic climate cost is to the forefront of any debate in providing 
public services.  The limited evidence which exists suggests that some quality 
approaches can reduce the cost of provision, for example, cutting out waste, 
changing the way we do things to make services more efficient and effective, and 
taking a person-centred approach.  A corresponding perspective is that, in a context 
of budget reductions, similar strategies would need to be employed if quality is not 
to be jeopardised, i.e.  if services are not to deteriorate when there are budget 
reductions (NESC, 2011). 
                                                          
 
19
  Depending on the context, ‘the centre’ can be government, a government department, a regulator etc.  The 
important point is that power (to varying degrees) is devolved from a central to the local or ‘frontline’ context. 
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1.7 Report Structure 
This report focuses on the arrangements which are intended to drive standards, 
ensure accountability, and support the achievement of quality in provision of 
policing services.  
Chapter 2 provides an outline of the Garda organisation and the context for many of 
the recent reforms introduced to bolster accountability and drive improvement, 
primarily through the Garda Síochána Act 2005. 
Chapter 3 outlines a number of significant institutions that have been established 
under the Garda Síochána Act 2005 and assesses their efficacy both in terms of 
maintaining accountability and fostering improvement. These include the Garda 
Síochána Ombudsman Commission, Garda Síochána Inspectorate, Garda 
Professional Standards Unit, Joint Policing Committees and Local Policing Fora. The 
chapter concludes by arguing that cultivating improvements requires service 
providers and users working together to craft solutions tailored to particular 
problems.  
Chapter 4 offers a case-study of this kind of approach in an area in the city-centre of 
Dublin. It outlines how a regularly convened forum was established between an 
urban community, and relevant personnel from the gardaí and Dublin City Council 
in order to develop a co-ordinated strategy in response to drug-dealing and drug-
related anti-social behaviour in the North Inner City.  The chapter concludes that 
while the Forum improved relations between community and gardaí it is not clear if 
it facilitated the kind of learning envisaged in the schema of triple-loop learning 
discussed in the Overview report. 
Chapter 5 concludes the report by assessing developments in the Irish system of 
policing through the lens of the regulatory and quality-inspired models examined in 
the overview report.   
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2.1 Introduction 
An Garda Síochána is a national police organisation, headed by a Commissioner who 
is answerable to the Minister for Justice and Equality (hereafter referred to as the 
Minister for Justice). The Commissioner is supported by two Deputy Commissioners, 
in charge of strategy and operations respectively, and a Chief Administrative Officer. 
A number of Assistant Commissioners in charge of various operational and 
organisational functions report to the Deputy Commissioners (see Chart). 
The work of the garda organisation is divided into a number of regions, divisions 
and districts. Assistant Commissioners have a responsibility for the operational 
management of policing in a number of different regions.  There are the Dublin 
Metropolitan Region; Northern Region; Western Region; Eastern Region and 
Southern Region, South East Region.. Each region is divided into divisions 
commanded by a Chief Superintendent and each division is then divided into 
districts commanded by a Superintendent who is assisted by a number of 
Inspectors. The districts are divided into sub-districts, each normally the 
responsibility of a Sergeant. Each sub-district usually has only one station, the 
strength of which may vary from three to one hundred gardaí. In some areas there 
are stations known as sub-stations, which for administrative purposes are attached 
to a parent station. These sub-stations are usually occupied by one garda member. 
In 2011, there are 703 garda stations throughout the country (www.garda.ie), with 
some of the smaller stations now being closed, in 2012, due to financial pressures. 
At present there are approximately 13,600 serving police officers. The National 
Recovery Plan 2011–14 envisages a reduction in the number of police officers to 
13,000 by 2014.  
New Garda rosters are to be implemented from April 30, 2012, in a nationwide pilot 
scheme covering all Gardaí, which will run for about 12 months. Under the new 
system, Garda management will have access to more Gardaí at times when they are 
most likely to be needed, such as weekend evenings and nights, rather than 
spreading the force equally over the 24 hours, as at present. 
In accordance with the Garda Síochána Act 2005, the Minister for Justice can decide 
that certain matters be a priority for the gardaí in any given year. Priorities for 2012, 
amongst others, stipulate that there should be a policing service which meets the 
needs of local communities (An Garda Síochána 2012: 4). These priorities set the 
framework under which the gardaí devise actions and indicators at national, 
regional and divisional levels through a national policing plan. 
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2.2 Reasons for Reform 
Like many professions in Ireland, An Garda Síochána was left to regulate itself for 
much of its history. It has been likened to a ‘blessed trinity’ of communal control in 
20th century Ireland, with the other members being the priest and school teacher. 
The fact that it was viewed by many as an important cultural resource and a vital 
bulwark against crime and terrorist activity meant that the Irish state was relatively 
unwilling to give credence to claims about abuses of power and calls for greater 
oversight. These claims surfaced in relation to the elicitation of confessions relating 
to paramilitary violence in the late 1970s but were not acted upon.  
Relying on self-regulation proved more difficult after the revelations of what 
became known as the Kerry Babies affair in 1984 in which a woman confessed to 
killing her new-born infant. She later claimed that her confessions had been forced 
from her and a tribunal was established to investigate these allegations. The fallout 
of this affair was that the Irish state established a new complaints mechanism to 
deal with allegations of improper behaviour by members of An Garda Síochána, 
known as the Garda Complaints Board.   
The Board’s independence from An Garda Síochána was limited as its investigations 
were conducted by garda members, overseen by a board comprised of civilians and 
representatives of the Garda Commissioner. According to the Minister for Justice at 
the time, the prospect of independent investigators was not warranted by either 
the scale or seriousness of the problem. When the operation of the complaints 
board was reviewed in 1991, it was contended that new safeguards had resulted in 
the virtual disappearance of complaints of ill-treatment.  
This perspective was not shared by the Committee for the Prevention of Torture 
(CPT), a body of the Council of Europe that visited Ireland for the first time in 1993. 
One of its main findings was a consistent allegation from people detained in custody 
that they had been ‘physically ill-treated’ (Council of Europe 1995: para. 13). As a 
result of their investigations, the CPT considered that ‘persons held in certain police 
establishments in Ireland run a not inconsiderable risk of being physically ill-treated’ 
(ibid.: para. 20). The composition of the Garda Complaints Board also drew adverse 
comment since its composition meant that it was unlikely to be considered as 
impartial, and its capacity to deal objectively with complaints was put in doubt 
(ibid.: para. 55). A system of independent inspection of police stations was also 
recommended. Following a second visit in 1998, the CPT reiterated its concern 
about the persistent allegations ‘regarding the use of excessive force by police 
officers’ (Council of Europe 1999: para. 14). It reminded the Irish government of its 
previous recommendation, that one of the main bulwarks against such allegations 
was the existence of an impartial and independent complaints mechanism. 
Satisfaction with the level of standards in Irish policing received a blow after the 
establishment, in 2002, of a Tribunal of Inquiry (known as the Morris Tribunal after 
its chairperson) into various allegations of police malpractice in the Donegal region 
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in the late 1990s. The Tribunal concluded that many of these allegations concerning 
negligent and corrupt behaviour were true. These included charges such as the 
framing of individuals for a crime they did not commit, the planting of weapons and 
explosives so that gardaí could claim the credit for discovering them, the 
mistreatment of suspects, and the improper use of an individual who was acting as 
a garda ‘agent’. The Tribunal also considered that the oversight capacity of the 
Garda Complaints Board was hindered as it was faced with a ‘set of circumstances 
that was far beyond its capability given the limited nature of its resources and in 
particular the limited nature of its investigatory powers under the Garda Síochána 
(Complaints) Act, 1986’ (Morris 2008: 321). The crux of the problem, according to 
the Morris Tribunal, was  
that without some level of independent oversight, it becomes likely 
that greater weight will be placed on the ‘needs of the Garda operation 
or investigation’ and lesser consideration will be accorded to the rights 
of the citizen, as stipulated by both the Irish Constitution and the ECHR 
[European Convention on Human Rights] (Morris 2006: 26).  
As part of this process of building up an independent level of oversight, the Morris 
Tribunal cautioned that those in charge of policy, particularly the Department of 
Justice and Garda Headquarters, should treat information relayed to them with a 
degree of scepticism. Previously these bodies had a disposition to take matters on 
trust from serving gardaí. The Tribunal advised that Garda Headquarters should take 
a ‘more active role’ in the management of garda divisions rather than conceiving of 
themselves as ‘merely the receivers of information’ (Morris 2004: 455).  
The combination of these revelations and the process of policing reform in Northern 
Ireland made it more difficult to resist the proposal that systems of oversight had to 
become more detached from police control. Calls to emulate the examples of a 
Police Ombudsman and Police Board in Northern Ireland were made more and 
more frequently by political representatives and campaigning groups in the 
Republic of Ireland. These demands were initially resisted on the basis that the 
situation in Northern Ireland in relation to policing differed substantially from the 
position within the Republic of Ireland. But advocates for change argued that the 
structures of An Garda Síochána were ‘not appropriate to the rights and freedoms 
individual [Irish] citizens now demand’ (Dáil Debates, 28 March 2002, vol. 551, col. 
937). Coupled with the facts emerging from the Morris Tribunal, the government 
felt compelled to concede the inadequacy of the Garda Complaints Board and 
announced, in 2001, that a Garda Inspectorate would be established to deal with 
complaints against gardaí. The Minister for Justice outlined his rationale for such an 
organisation as arising:  
Where specific Garda systems or operations do not measure up to the 
appropriate standards, for example, the difficulties which arose in Co. 
Donegal. I am looking closely at the question of an Inspectorate. A new 
independent Inspectorate with appropriate powers might be very well 
placed to conduct the necessary investigations in such cases (Dáil 
Reports, 7 February 2001).  
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The Irish Human Rights Commission insisted that there was a basic incompatibility 
between an Inspectorate and an Ombudsman, with the former being more 
concerned with efficiency and the latter orientated around human-rights values. 
The Minister for Justice conceded that the Commission had a ‘legitimate point’ (Dáil 
Debates, 6 February 2003, vol. 560, cols 1406–7), and this distinction was realised 
through the separate institutions of a Garda Inspectorate and a three-person 
Ombudsman Commission being introduced in the final version of the Bill that was 
passed into law, the Garda Síochána Act 2005.  
Before discussing the contents and consequences of this Act for standards and 
accountability pertaining to policing, it is worth noting that An Garda Síochána 
instituted a thorough review of its own organisation as the Morris Tribunal unveiled 
its findings through various reports. Nine internal working groups from An Garda 
Síochána were established to deal with such subjects as management development, 
internal audit, and issues involving personnel. From the perspective of this report, 
the most important was a review group concerned with identifying barriers to 
furthering the principles of performance and accountability. Putting these issues 
into practice was defined as the collection, collation and reporting of information 
about how an organisation is performing on specified criteria. The gardaí considered 
that establishing a framework to operationalise these aspirations would allow the 
following benefits to be derived: 
 It could identify whether An Garda Síochána is providing an efficient and 
effective service to the Public; 
 It could ask An Garda Síochána to identify and understand problems by 
confirming what is known or revealing what can be known; 
 It could show where improvements need to be made; 
 It could ensure decisions are based on fact, not on emotion, by revealing 
problems that customary routines might pass over. 
It was recommended that a Performance and Accountability Framework be 
established. This framework involves a series of conferences that are designed to 
formalise and embed the aforementioned benefits for all sections within An Garda 
Síochána. The process occurs daily at district level, fortnightly at divisional level, 
monthly at regional level and once every quarter at the overall corporate level. At 
district level the review group proposed that a daily briefing meeting would be held, 
which would be chaired by a Superintendent or Inspector. Occurrences of the 
previous twenty-four hours would be reviewed, noting the kinds of incident, time, 
location and possible causes. The importance of internal regulation and controls 
should not be discounted and will be returned to later in this report.  
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2.3 Conclusion 
Because control of An Garda Síochána relied so much on self-regulation, the Garda 
Síochána Act 2005 marked a dramatic shift in how the garda organisation was 
regulated. It has been described as the ‘the most profound piece of legislation 
relating to the Garda Síochána in the history of the State’ and the ‘catalyst for the 
most fundamental reform and transformation of the force into a modern police 
service’ (Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Dáil Eireann, 29th November 
2006). The implications of the Act for policing is examined in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
The New Regulatory 
Institutions of Policing 
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3.1 Introduction 
The regulation of policing in Ireland has been profoundly affected by the 
introduction of the Garda Síochána Act 2005. This legislation set down the functions 
of the gardaí for the first time, which involves providing policing and security 
services for the state with various objectives enunciated such as preserving peace 
and public order; protecting life and property; and vindicating the human rights of 
each individual, amongst others. The legislation also allows for the Minister for 
Justice to determine priorities and establish performance targets for An Garda 
Síochána as it seeks to meet these objectives. As of yet, no performance targets 
have been set, although the Action plan under the Croke Park Agreement 2010–14 
for the gardaí acknowledges that the garda organisation should be subject to 
performance management that ‘takes account of the unique nature of a policing 
service’.  This objective is due to be implemented in the first quarter of 2013.   
The Garda Síochána Act 2005 is notable for the way in which it introduces several 
new and distinct avenues of accountability for policing, apart from granting the 
Minister more overt powers of direction. These include the requirement that the 
Garda Commissioner shall give evidence to the Public Accounts Committee and that 
a five-person Audit Committee be established. On an individual level, the Act 
introduced a new requirement that a member of An Garda Síochána shall, when 
directed to do so by a member of a higher rank, account for any act done or 
omission made by the member while on duty. But the Act is perhaps most notable 
for the range of new bodies that has been established to enhance standards and 
accountability within An Garda Síochána. These include the following: 
3.2 Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission 
The Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission (hereafter referred to as GSOC) is 
responsible for receiving and dealing with complaints made by the public 
concerning the conduct of members of An Garda Síochána, although people may 
still make a complaint directly to the gardaí. GSOC’s mission is to provide the public 
with independent and effective oversight of policing, and to deal with the public’s 
complaints concerning gardaí fairly and efficiently so that everyone can have 
confidence in the complaints system. The most notable difference of GSOC from the 
previous complaints body, the Garda Complaints Board, is that it employs a number 
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of independent investigating officers to examine the more serious cases rather than 
relying on serving officers within the gardaí (some complaints relating to issues like 
discourtesy are deemed suitable for informal resolution). 
In 2010, GSOC received 2,258 complaints from members of the public, of which 722 
were inadmissible. Reasons for inadmissibility were varied, ranging from complaints 
lying beyond the six-month time limit for submission; relating to the general control 
and direction of An Garda Síochána rather than the conduct of an individual office; 
or deemed by GSOC to be ‘vexatious’. This last category encompasses those 
allegations that are deemed too minor too warrant an investigation. Among the 
allegations the following types of complaint were most prominent: abuse of 
authority, neglect of duty, discourtesy and non-fatal offences. The most prominent 
factors relating to situations that gave rise to complaints were 
searches/investigations, and arrests and road traffic incidents. The most prominent 
locations of interactions that gave rise to complaints were public places, domestic 
residences and garda custody (GSOC 2011).  
GSOC has noted that a significant number of the incidents brought to its attention 
‘fall into what could be described as service complaints and GSOC has engaged with 
An Garda Síochána to seek mechanisms to better identify and resolve such issues 
without, necessarily, the need to apportion blame’ (2011: 27). In 2010, twenty-eight 
out of one hundred and thirty seven cases were informally resolved and in regard to 
another ninety nine  cases, further action was either not necessary or practicable. In 
total over 2010, twenty-seven files were referred to the Director of Public 
Prosecutions (DPP) by GSOC, relating to thirty-one members of An Garda Síochána 
and seven persons who were not gardaí. An adult caution was administered in one 
case. The DPP directed prosecution in eleven cases relating to fourteen members of 
An Garda Síochána and three people who were not gardaí. Eleven of these cases 
were before the courts as of 31 December 2010. Whether the denominator for this 
figure of fourteen members liable for prosecution is considered as the total number 
of serving gardaí (see The Irish Times, 10 August 2011) or instead all those officers 
against whom a complaint has been lodged, the resulting figure is still a very small 
percentage. What this figure underlines is that recourse to court prosecutions is 
used sparingly and is probably neither relevant nor effective for the vast number of 
incidents that provoke a complaint.   
GSOC is not restricted to investigating matters that have been the subject of a 
complaint. It is empowered to examine cases where it appears that the conduct of a 
garda officer has resulted in the death of or serious harm to an individual. In 
relation to such incidents, GSOC, in its report for 2008, analysed the context in 
which the conduct of gardaí resulted in death or serious harm and noted that the 
most prevalent factor was road traffic. GSOC noted that ‘it is apparent that road 
policing emerges as a significant issue’ for the gardaí and they reiterated the 
Inspectorate’s call for a review of all internal garda policy relating to roads policing, 
including the need for greater training to prepare gardaí for policing of the roads 
(Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission 2008a: 27).  
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The issue of general policy implications arising from individual conduct has been 
aired by GSOC in a report to the Minister for Justice and Oireachtas (Garda Síochána 
Ombudsman Commission 2008b). In this report, GSOC has noted that no further 
action regarding a complaint relating to the death or serious harm of a person can 
be taken if GSOC finds no misbehaviour by the garda member concerned. GSOC has 
commented that this ‘strikes us as a dangerously limiting provision’ as investigation 
may reveal ‘systemic issues within the force or unacceptable practices’ (ibid.: 34). 
GSOC has suggested that, if it appeared desirable in the public interest, a report 
should be presented before the Houses of the Oireachtas highlighting systemic 
matters that require attention or airing. 
GSOC can examine systemic issues that extend beyond a single complaint to wider 
matters pertaining to a practice, policy or procedure that would either prevent or 
reduce the incidence of such complaints. The Minister for Justice may make a 
request for GSOC to do so, on his or her own initiative, or do so following a 
recommendation of GSOC that a policy or procedure be examined. GSOC has made 
a number of such requests, concerning, for example, the management of protests 
and the examination of aspects of the processing of fines. The Minister at the time 
did not agree to the former request but assented to the latter. Other similar bodies 
possess a greater power of initiative. In Ontario, Canada, the Independent Police 
Review Director may examine and review issues of a systemic nature that are the 
subject of, or that give rise to, complaints made by members of the public and may 
make recommendations respecting such issues to the Solicitor General, the 
Attorney General, Chiefs of police or any other person or body (Independent Police 
Review Act 2007, sec. 57). 
GSOC has noted (Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission 2008b) that there are 
certain aspects of garda activity that it is precluded from investigating or where 
there is ambiguity about the appropriateness of its jurisdiction. These include: 
 A complaint is not admissible insofar as it relates to the general direction and 
control of an Garda Síochána by the Garda Commissioner; 
 It is often difficult to determine the point at which inefficiency or under-
performance can become a ‘neglect of duty’––and therefore constitute a breach 
of the Disciplinary Code. 
If we compare the work of GSOC to what is considered best practice by other 
independent oversight bodies of police, then some differences emerge. Walker 
(2005) has argued that within the United States a ‘new world of police 
accountability’ is emerging in which a greater focus on organisational causes rather 
than the individual behavioural symptoms is evident. Earlier reform efforts had 
focused on misbehaving individuals and notorious incidents. Walker (2005: 38) 
argues that they failed to reach ‘deep into police organisations’ and affect day-to-
day police work. Failures like this occur for a variety of reasons but from our 
perspective, perhaps the most interesting is that ‘past reform efforts never involved 
institutionalised procedures for sustaining reform over time’ (ibid.: 39) 
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These new procedures emphasise systematic data collection and analysis. Examples 
include ‘critical incident reporting’ in which police officers are obliged to document 
how they have responded in situations where a risk was posed to the life, liberty or 
dignity of a citizen. These reports are then reviewed by a supervisor to see if they 
were in compliance with the organisation’s policy. Supervisors are also expected to 
utilise ‘early intervention’ systems, which flag up potentially problematic behaviour. 
In keeping with the tenets of responsive regulation, enhanced frontline supervision 
is one of the crucial features through which this new accountability is delivered. 
Early intervention systems, for example, are an instrument for highlighting potential 
problems that need to be addressed early and are themselves a means of assessing 
the performance of supervisors. They also encourage a corrective rather than a 
punitive or formal legalistic solution to problems.  
A great deal of the debate on the achievement of high standards in a human service 
like policing has focused on the institution of the Garda Ombudsman Commission. 
In particular, it has focused on both the extent of the powers granted to GSOC and 
the extent of its autonomy from the organisation it is overseeing, An Garda 
Síochána. As we have seen in the first report of this project, this is an issue that 
features prominently in debates over the appropriate aspects of regulatory policy 
generally. Some believe that regulators should maintain their distance from those 
whom they are regulating to avoid capture and rely heavily on formal powers of 
enforcement. Others consider that regulators need to engage with the entities they 
regulate and try to cultivate the relevant organisation capacities that are necessary 
for lasting improvement. Hence, there is as much emphasis on learning as on 
enforcement. 
In the sphere of policing, the emphasis on greater formal enforcement powers 
draws sustenance from the issue of police malpractice that gave birth to the Garda 
Síochána Ombudsman Commission, but it may not always be helpful to view the 
issue of police performance and policing standards through this prism. Its 
prominence may obscure some of the necessary conditions for both upholding and 
improving standards in general. Greater legal powers vis-à-vis both individual 
officers and the garda organisation itself may be of less importance than a greater 
understanding of the reasons why events occurred as they did, and a willingness to 
learn from any review and establish appropriate remedial action, as evidenced in 
current best practice in the United States (referenced above). GSOC itself broached 
this issue when it noted the importance of systemic issues that pass beyond the 
control of any one officer and when it began its analysis of contextual factors that 
contributed to serious death or harm. Yet this analysis has not been progressed to 
the extent that would allow it to make more detailed recommendations that would 
impact on practice. In some respects, this is seen as the role of the Garda 
Inspectorate, the role of which is discussed below. 
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3.3 Garda Síochána Inspectorate 
The role of the Garda Síochána Inspectorate is to ensure that the resources 
available to the Garda Siochána are used so as to achieve and maintain the highest 
levels of efficiency and effectiveness in its operation and administration, as 
measured by reference to the best standards of comparable policy services. 
Accomplishing this means ensuring that the resources available to An Garda 
Síochána are used to achieve the highest level of efficiency and effectiveness in its 
operation and administration, as measured by reference to best international 
policing practices. The Garda Inspectorate carries out its inquiries either at the 
request of or with the consent of the Minister for Justice.  The Inspectorate is 
required to submit reports of these inquiries to the Minister with recommendations 
for any action that the Inspectorate considers necessary.  
To date, it has published seven reports on a variety of topics including the following: 
senior management structures; roads policing review; missing persons review; and a 
report on resource allocation. In April 2008, the Inspectorate published its review of 
how the recommendations contained within its reports had been progressed and 
implemented by An Garda Síochána and it has continued this practice. The 
Inspectorate updates the implementation tables on its website every six months.   
Some of its most important reports relate to its recommendations concerning 
future policing in Ireland and the issue of resources allocation. Regarding the 
former, it noted that in a jurisdiction the size of Ireland, a unitary police service 
made sense. After commending such a structure, the Inspectorate noted that it 
possessed some inherent weaknesses, namely the ‘the tendency to centralise 
decision-making, resulting in a potential misalignment of responsibility and 
accountability at operational level’ (Garda Síochána Inspectorate 2007: 8). To inhibit 
such tendencies, the Inspectorate believed that there is   
considerable scope for Garda management to devolve greater decision-
making and accountability to the six Garda regions and national units, 
while maintaining strategic direction at the headquarters level. The 
need for this devolution is becoming more significant as the 
organisation increases in size and the policing environment becomes 
more complex and diverse. The Inspectorate is convinced that the 
strengthening the Garda regional structures is crucial to future change 
and the enhancement of Irish policing (ibid.). 
An Garda Síochána has responded that each regional Assistant Commissioner is 
responsible for the strategic planning process for their region, which is intended to 
address local policing imperatives and priorities. These officers are responsible for 
the deployment of resources to meet these demands and their progress is 
monitored at a monthly management meeting.  An Garda Síochána accepts that 
‘further devolution is required’ (Garda Síochána Inspectorate 2011a: 3), including 
significant new approaches relevant to the recommendations in the Inspectorate’s 
report on Resource Allocation. 
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In this report on resource allocation, the Inspectorate commented that An Garda 
Síochána does not have ‘systems in place to measure workload’ (Garda Síochána 
Inspectorate 2009: 5). These kinds of systems are necessary to have the ‘right 
numbers of police officers in the right places at the right times to meet community 
needs’ (ibid.). The Inspectorate considered that this was exceptional when police 
organisations in general are examined and was unusual even for emergency services 
in Ireland, with both the Irish fire and ambulance services already operating such 
systems.  Various measures have been considered to rectify these issues (see Garda 
Síochána Inspectorate 2011b) with many of them dependent on funding. 
3.4 Garda Professional Standards Unit (GPSU)  
This unit is internal to An Garda Síochána. Its role is to examine and review the 
operational, administrative and management performance of An Garda Síochána 
with reference to the best standards of comparable police services. Its role is 
considered to be preventative in the sense that it concentrates on those processes 
that are considered to bear significant risk—be they corporate, organisational or 
otherwise—such as looking after prisoners in custody where harms occur very 
infrequently. Gardaí escort and oversee the detention of thousands of people every 
year and this almost always happens without incident. Yet there is still a low risk of 
harm occurring, which is why it is important that gardaí adhere to appropriate 
procedures to forestall this possibility.  Therefore, the function of the GPSU is to 
remind frontline staff of the importance of procedures and ensure that they are 
being followed so that low probability harms do not occur.  
The GPSU gathers information from relevant documentary sources as well as 
through interviews with relevant personnel. After all information is gathered, it is 
used to prepare a checklist of questions, which are then deployed in an interview 
with key personnel to test local compliance with the current stated policy in each 
area. According to the GPSU, the information gained is then assessed to  
 Identify if an integrated set of sound approaches exists in the organisational 
processes being examined; 
 Examine whether these approaches are deployed in a systematic way that 
ensures full implementation; 
 Establish if the approaches are regularly assessed and reviewed using structured 
monitoring and analysis of results achieved;  
 Establish whether these results are leading to ongoing learning activities, 
development of improvement plans and implementation of these 
improvements. 
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The GPSU examines three or four full divisions every year to ensure that they are 
following appropriate procedures, with the investigation often lasting up to a period 
of three weeks. Examinations have been conducted in fourteen operational 
divisions and two divisions of Garda Headquarters with over eighty policing and 
national security processes probed. Following this examination, the findings are 
then sent on to the relevant officer in charge of the division, highlighting strengths 
and pointing to areas that could be improved. A supportive rather than an 
inquisitorial approach is adopted and agreement is usually obtained on where 
improvements can be made. The GPSU assesses implementation on a continuous 
basis and carries out a review within six months to evaluate progress against the 
improvement plan and to provide advice and assistance if required. Thematic 
reviews have also been conducted, such as examining guidelines on missing persons 
or emergency planning.  In addition, nine operational initiatives have been 
accredited by Excellence Ireland. These have included improvements to the 
implementation of bail conditions in Cork and the investigation of burglary in 
Meath. Staff of the GPSU recognise that translating their findings and the 
achievements of the nine operational initiatives into further progress on the ground 
remains an outstanding issue. They have been exploring how these messages can be 
disseminated and reinforced through a variety of methods including daily briefings 
and reminders to supervisors, amongst others (Interview with personnel from 
GPSU).  
The work of the GPSU represents an interesting and innovative attempt by an 
organisation to continuously review and improve its operations, thus raising 
standards. Its detailed work reflects the multi-faceted nature of the garda 
organisation as it deals with incidents relating to public disorder, traffic, 
immigration and human trafficking, to name but a few. Therefore, it is a protracted 
task to ensure that matters like these are underpinned by sound processes that 
contribute to high standards. Notwithstanding this broad portfolio of tasks, a crucial 
component in achieving high standards of policing will be the quality of relationship 
with a community and how the gardaí are perceived to be contributing to people’s 
needs. The institutions and procedures through which the gardaí liaise with a 
community are examined in the next two sections. 
3.5 Joint Policing Committees 
Section 36 of the Garda Síochána Act 2005 provides for the establishment of a Joint 
Policing Committee (JPC) in each local authority administrative area and as part of 
the local government structures. The purpose of these committees is to provide a 
forum where a local authority and the senior garda officers responsible for the 
policing of that area, with the participation of political representatives and those 
identified with community interests, can consult, discuss and make 
recommendations on matters affecting the policing of the area. More specifically, 
their task is to keep under review: 
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 The levels and patterns of crime, disorder and anti-social behaviour in that area 
(including the patterns and levels of misuse of alcohol and drugs); and  
 The factors underlying and contributing to the levels of crime, disorder and anti-
social behaviour in the area. 
They also have a function in advising the local authority concerned and An Garda 
Síochána on how they might best perform their functions having regard to the need 
to do everything feasible to improve the safety and quality of life and to prevent 
crime, disorder and anti-social behaviour within the area. 
Starting in 2006, the Committees were established on a pilot basis in twenty-nine 
local authority areas. Following evaluation of the pilot phase, the roll out of 
committees to all of the 114 city, county and town council areas was put in train on 
24 September 2008. Guidelines on the operation of the Committees were made by 
the Minister for Justice and Law Reform, after consultation with the Minister for the 
Environment, Heritage and Local Government and the Minister for Community, 
Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs. Public opinion about the JPCs seems to be supportive 
although there has been some dissatisfaction aired about the level of community 
representation on these committees. Also some have queried whether the JPCs 
were sufficiently attuned to concrete problems in the way that more localised fora 
are (IPA 2011: 4). 
3.6 Local Policing Fora 
There is provision under Section 36 (2) (d) of the Garda Síochána Act 2005 for the 
establishment, where appropriate, of Local Policing Fora at neighbourhood level. 
These are intended to operate in a more informal way than the Joint Policing 
Committees and are intended to deepen the engagement between gardaí, the local 
authority and neighbourhood communities. Beginning in 2009, a process was set in 
train where Local Policing Fora would be established in the fourteen Local Drug Task 
Force Areas.  
3.7 How Well is the Regulation Working?  
Despite the emergence of several distinct bodies concerned with the regulation of 
the gardaí and standards therein, their overall effect is not clear. Each of these 
institutions focuses on one particular aspect of policing: the Ombudsman 
Commission on abuses of authority, broadly considered; the Inspectorate on poor 
management processes; the GPSU on operational and administrative issues; the 
Joint Policing Committees and Local Policing Fora on standards of policing within 
localities and neighbourhoods. It is difficult to gauge whether the establishment of 
these bodies has led to an overall level of improvement in the quality of policing 
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although there is some evidence that improvements have been obtained in 
particular areas. For example, the Council of Europe’s most recent report on places 
of detention in Ireland in 2010 noted with regard to garda stations that ‘many 
persons with past experience of detention stated that the treatment by the gardaí 
had improved in recent years and that they had been treated correctly during their 
most recent period of custody’ (Committee for Prevention of Torture Report 2011). 
Some might consider that these oversight bodies are superfluous since public 
confidence in the gardaí is apparently very high. The garda survey of public attitudes 
in 2008 found that satisfaction with the overall garda level of service to the 
community stood at 81 per cent (Garda Research Unit 2008). It has occasionally 
been higher (87 per cent in 2002) and lower (79 per cent in 2006). Likewise, over 80 
per cent of respondents identified the gardaí as doing a very good or fairly good job 
in their locality.  It is not quite clear what produces such a level of satisfaction with 
the gardaí. It cannot be through personal contact as only 40 per cent of respondents 
had an encounter with the gardaí in the previous year. In fact, the Garda 
Ombudsman Commission’s survey in its 2011 report (p. 49) shows that ‘those who 
had a recent interaction with the Garda Síochána are less satisfied than the average 
[of 80 per cent]’, a finding that is consistent with international research on this 
subject (Bradford et al. 2008: 11)—the reverse is generally true for health services 
where interaction increases satisfaction and confounds expectations. Other 
research has shown that people’s beliefs about the police are heavily determined by 
perceptions about the overall quality of life within their community, which is not 
something which the gardaí can easily influence. 
While the vast majority of people stated that they were satisfied with gardaí’s level 
of service, 72 per cent stated that the service needed to be improved. Unprompted 
suggestions for improvement included requests for more gardaí, more gardaí on 
foot patrols, more contact with the community and longer station opening hours 
(ibid.: 25). This reflects that the issue of policing quality is being defined in 
quantitative terms as was highlighted at the outset of this report. Given the 
reductions in personnel and the closure of some stations, identified in section 2.1, 
this expectation will become increasingly difficult to meet. 
It should be noted that national surveys are not necessarily best suited to answering 
questions about how well a particular service is operating. First of all, they present a 
picture at an aggregate level so they may not be able to capture where a service is 
doing well or badly at a more local level and, more importantly, why this is the case. 
For example, the survey conducted by the Garda Research Unit in 2008 states that 
satisfaction is lowest in local authority housing compared to other housing tenure 
categories but is unable to offer an explanation as to why this is so. This raises the 
question of whether the gardaí have sufficiently diagnostic tools to enable them to 
analyse their service in a sufficiently disaggregated manner, which facilitates its 
improvement. 
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3.8 What Arrangements Are There to Continuously 
Improve the Service?  
Lack of clarity over whether these new oversight organisations have instilled 
positive changes may be related to a deficiency in how regulation is being 
conducted. In the first chapter, drawing from the Overview report, the idea of 
meta-regulation was introduced. This concepts refers to the idea that good 
standards are achieved by government encouraging organisations to put in place 
their own systems of internal control and management. These systems enable 
monitoring of critical performance functions and also diagnose if performance is 
falling short of the requisite standards. The regulator then analyses these internal 
systems in an effort to gauge how well the regulated organisation is maintaining 
standards. There is a requirement on the regulated entity to demonstrate how 
these systems and procedures have led to demonstrable improvements. In section 
3.2, we saw that this is increasingly becoming a norm of best practice with regard to 
forestalling complaints against the police, as supervisors regularly monitor and 
evaluate the performance of their personnel to gauge if there any incipient 
problems.  
Several of the oversight institutions that have been established under the Garda 
Síochána Act 2005 do not seem to undertake the detailed or diagnostic monitoring 
necessary to realise sustainable improvements. The Ombudsman Commission 
examines what might be called the single symptoms of problems – complaints – as 
well as examining the conduct of members of An Garda Síochána, which may have 
resulted in the death of, or serious harm to, a person. GSOC does not really address 
what might be the underlying causes of these complaints and incidents although 
powers granted under Section 106 permit the Commission, either at the request of 
or with the consent of the Minister, to enquire into certain policies, practices and 
procedures. This broader power is thus dependent on the Minister to be ‘activated’. 
The guidelines on the Joint Policing Committees do not mention how they might 
undertake ‘a detailed review of levels and patterns of crimes’, even though this is 
explicitly required by the legislation. And even if they did, there exists some degree 
of uncertainty about how they could assess the progress that is being made, in the 
absence of a communications mechanism to share experiences and disseminate 
best practice amongst all Joint Policing Committees throughout the country (Dept. 
of Justice and Equality 2011: 11). 
An Garda Síochána’s National Model of Community Policing (2009) reports that 
community gardaí will be proactive in building and developing neighbourhood 
profiles of their respective patrol areas through the garda Customer Relationship 
Model. This model is concerned with identifying who the gardaí’s relevant 
customers are and targeting them with appropriate resources. The use of this 
model is mentioned under a section entitled ‘Problem-Solving’, and it is not clear 
how well a commitment to provide resources sits with a promise of problem-
solving, as the latter is premised upon some sort of diagnostic monitoring of the 
causes of a problem. 
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If authors like Sabel, Seddon and Sparrow are correct (see bibliography for 
references), to achieve a good service as opposed to the prevention of some 
flagrant abuses of power requires a careful process of diagnostic monitoring at the 
appropriate level, close to where incidents occur. In fact, the gardaí has had a long 
history of consultation with the community. The next section reviews this process of 
consultation and concludes that it has been laudable in maintaining the gardaí’s 
public image and relationship with many citizens; however, it has not had a great 
effect on overall levels of policing service. It might seem that switching attention 
away from regulatory bodies to institutions dedicated toward public consultation 
entails a dilution of interest in the issue of standards. But this is only the case if it is 
believed that high standards can only be achieved through an coercive top-down 
process. By contrast, it is increasingly being recognised that standards can be 
pursued and raised through the actions of non-state actors (Scott 2010) and the use 
of multiple rather than single policy instruments and that mechanisms of informal 
social control, often propelled by civil society, frequently prove more effective than 
formal legal powers (Gunningham 2010).  
If standards can be inculcated through some sort of bottom-up process, based upon 
careful analysis and consultation, then this may lend weight to the view that the 
recipients of a service should be involved in the attainment of high standards. 
Moreover, it may be the case that instigating this kind of localised involvement may 
pre-empt the kinds of incidents that give rise to complaints. The Garda Ombudsman 
Commission has noted that ‘it is often difficult to determine the point at which 
inefficiency or under-performance can become a neglect of ‘duty’ (Garda Síochána 
Ombudsman Commission 2008b: 18), yet it is this kind of issue that an intensive 
form of community consultation could pick up and resolve. So the merit in focusing 
on forms of localised involvement and close consultation with providers and users 
of a human service is that it can lead to a cycle of continuous improvement if 
carried out properly. 
Before examining how community engagement with policing has evolved in Ireland, 
it is worth noting what are considered the characteristics of best practice in this 
field. Since the mid-1990s, the US city of Chicago has been refashioning its policing 
model in an effort to make the police organisation more attentive to the community 
it serves. Chicago is generally considered to a pioneer of successful police 
engagement with the community.  
Chicago’s community policy strategy operates by dividing the city up into 280 
neighbourhoods or ‘beats’, which are served by a group of about nine police 
officers. A ‘beat meeting’ is held once a month between members of the public and 
the group of police officers responsible for that locality. Attendance at these 
meetings has proven stable. So the first essential feature of this model is 
community involvement. The second necessary component is a decentralisation of 
police functions whereby authority and responsibility are devolved down the 
organisation so frontline staff can react to local problems and develop solutions 
that are customised to specific conditions. And linked to this is the third feature that 
is required to make police engagement with the community successful, namely a 
problem-solving orientation. This is necessary to discover what kind of situations 
produce repeated calls for police attention or assistance.  
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In the mid-1990s, 12,000 citizens were enlisted on a training course to understand 
how communities could accomplish such problem-solving. Very often, it might be 
revealed that the causes, such as poor street lighting that encourages illegal 
activities, are beyond the remit of the police organisation to solve and this requires 
linkages with other organisations that can offer solutions that are not based purely 
on law enforcement. This is why the Chicago model developed a form that captures 
information about the services requested and the problem locations the citizens 
indicate at the meetings. These forms are then forwarded to the Mayor’s office 
where they are inputted in a case-tracking system and assigned to the relevant 
agency. The Mayor’s office then employs personnel to verify that the appropriate 
work has been carried out. The most comprehensive evaluation of the Chicago 
policing model has been explicit that  
if community policing is just the police department’s programme, it is 
at risk of failing. Without the support of the rest of the municipal 
service infrastructure, it’s not going to be able to carry the freight 
(Skogan 2007: 5–6). 
Despite the successes of the Chicago model, it has found problem-solving to be the 
most difficult issue to establish and sustain (Skogan 2004).  
Having elaborated some of the necessary features of successful community policing, 
the next chapter examines how similar endeavours of police engaging the 
community in Ireland have fared. 
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Chapter 4 
Satisfying the Policing Needs 
of Local Communities 
AVOIDING  EXTREMES OF REGULATION TO ENHANCE POLICING          30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
For much of its history, An Garda Síochána did not develop formal links with the 
communities it policed; instead gardaí relied on informal everyday contact and the 
cultural affinities it shared with these communities. These endeavours were not 
without success as commentators noted that the gardaí were one of the ‘striking 
successes of the new state’ (McNiffe 1997) and that it would be difficult to find any 
other police force with such a high standing. However, significant social changes in 
the 1970s such as greater urbanisation, coupled with the greater deprivation 
associated with an economic downturn, caused the gardaí to rethink their 
approach.    
In 1983, an Oireachtas committee advocated the establishment of Neighbourhood 
Watch schemes, which would afford citizens some means of channelling 
information about crime to the gardaí. It was intended to add a dimension of local 
involvement to policing without transforming it in any fundamental way. A pilot 
scheme was established in 1984 and rolled out around the country the following 
year. By 1998, there were 3,500 such schemes around the country although the 
evidence on their efficacy has been mixed, with the most authoritative study 
claiming that there has been no evidence that participants feel safer or that 
involved communities have a higher rate of reporting to gardaí (McKeown and 
Brosnan 1998). The Association of Garda Sergeants and Inspectors has commented 
that ‘once the initial enthusiasm has waned, the schemes tend to drift into oblivion’ 
(Joint Committee on Justice 2005: 19). In addition, it has proven especially difficult 
to establish Neighbourhood Watch in disadvantaged areas where there is an 
ambivalent relationship between the local community and gardaí. However, 
members of the public do distinguish between the commitment and dedication of 
individual members of the gardaí and the organisation itself, which may have 
different priorities. One person stated that  
I think their hierarchical structure and their whole accountability didn’t 
marry well with, really the whole notion of community policing that we 
were trying to envisage and want. They were particularly sensitive if we 
strayed into the whole area of having any say in decisions (cited in 
Mulcahy and O’Mahoney 2005: 14). 
In 2009, the gardaí launched a new national model of community policing that 
emphasises, amongst other things, the importance of community partnerships and 
problem-solving (An Garda Síochána 2009). However, the model is rather reticent 
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about the institutions through which these ideals will be realised and the means by 
which this might be accomplished. There is evidence of a promising approach 
toward community involvement, which is reviewed in the next section. 
4.2 The Establishment of Community Policing Fora 
Community policing is most likely to exist in long-established and cohesive 
communities in which ‘crime is not a problem’.  Given this tendency, the most 
comprehensive evaluation of community policing found that there was such a bias 
to settled, homogenous communities that they asked whether ‘these [community 
policing] schemes have any relevance in disadvantaged urban areas where there is a 
high level of drug-related crime and where the gardaí are distrusted’ (McKeown and 
Brosnan 1998: 84). The evaluation concluded that such schemes were ill-suited to 
those communities where there is little support for the gardaí and which have been 
adversely affected by the epidemic of drugs and related criminal activities that have 
blighted many disadvantaged urban communities over the past decade. However, 
the case study described below, of a community policing initiative in part of Dublin’s 
North Inner City, demonstrates that these structural characteristics are not 
insuperable obstacles to a functioning model of community policing.20  
4.3 History of the North Inner City Policing Forum 
The area concerned runs from Marlborough Street to the Royal Canal and from 
Dorset Street to Amiens Street in Dublin’s North Inner City. It was greatly affected 
by the drugs crisis of the 1980s and 1990s. At the time, many citizens were unsure 
of what was happening in their communities as a result of escalating drug 
consumption. People were aware of the damages caused by alcohol abuse but were 
genuinely unsure of what the symptoms of heroin addiction represented. Certain 
activists believed that there was a ‘great deal going on behind closed doors’ 
(Interview A) and that some people were traumatised as a result of the drugs 
problem but nobody was confident in their understanding of this issue.   
Some people within the community convened a meeting to gather their knowledge 
about what was happening and develop some solidarity and support amongst 
residents. Fifty people came together and began to share their stories of what their 
lives were like as a result of trying to live with drug addiction. It was the first time 
                                                          
 
20
  Interviews were conducted with the following individuals:  a community representative who has had a long 
involvement with the Community Policing Forum; a senior garda officer who is familiar with the community 
and the operation of the Forum; and personnel from Dublin city Council who gave their perspective on how the 
Forum functions. When they are referenced in the text, they are referred to as Interview A, B and C 
respectively. 
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that people here believed that they had an ‘open, comfortable, space’ (Interview A) 
to discuss the issue. The following week over one hundred people came to the 
meeting. Attendance at the meetings grew and grew through word of mouth. 
What began as a support group soon began to discuss the scale of the problem and 
they realised that it was more serious than first envisaged. Concerned citizens then 
began to discuss what could be done to address the issue and pooled their 
knowledge about where drug-dealing was taking place and who was responsible. 
Having pooled their collective knowledge about the subject, citizens then began to 
take action by marching on the houses of drug-dealers. Initially, this was successful 
as ‘drug-dealers began leaving the area without any evictions or agency coming in’, 
and it was seen to be an example of ‘people-power’ (Interview A). Action extended 
to the control of certain streets as concerned residents blocked access to public 
streets for drug-dealers who then moved onto other areas. While this strategy was 
successful in curtailing drug-dealing, after a period of six weeks vigilantism set in as 
a result of false information being disseminated so that both innocent people and 
drug addicts were targeted. Activists then realised that they had to ‘back-off’ from 
their street campaign and that the resolution of the drugs crisis was beyond the 
capacity of any entity to solve alone, be it the community, gardaí or Dublin City 
Council.  
People from the area then decided that the various street groups needed to come 
together and thought that the best way of organising this was through a policing 
forum. A proposal was developed that the three relevant groups—community, 
gardaí and Dublin City Council—needed to work in a more coherent way and this 
idea was submitted to the Local Drugs Group Task Force for approval. In 1997, a 
proposal was made by the Inter-Agency Drugs Project (IADP) and the Inner City 
Organisation Network (ICON) that a Community Policing and Estate Management 
Forum (CPF) be attached to the North Inner City Drugs Task Force. It was agreed 
that the CPF would involve residents from the north-east inner city, personnel from 
the Local Drugs Task Force, members of An Garda Síochána and Dublin City Council. 
The task of the CPF would be to develop a co-ordinated strategy in response to 
drug-dealing and drug-related anti-social behaviour in the North Inner City. The 
board of management of the CPF then sought to employ someone to sustain the 
efforts of the Forum and motivate members of the public to participate. At first, 
reactions were ‘very negative as they [residents] didn’t trust the gardaí’ and didn’t 
want to work with them; residents were equally negative about Dublin City Council 
(Interview A). 
Initial efforts met with little success and some of the early meetings were very 
poorly attended as a result of public antipathy. Members of the public were worried 
about being associated with the drugs issue because of fears about intimidation. As 
a result, the Forum initially operated as a maintenance group meeting and Dublin 
City Council had to respond to requests for facilities to be fixed quickly in order to 
win the trust of local residents (which emphasises Skogan’s (2007) point about the 
contribution of municipal services to any urban policing initiative). Gaining such trust 
took about twelve months before issues concerning anti-social or drug-related 
behaviour could begin to be addressed. Local residents were encouraged to share 
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the information concerning such behaviour with the CPF employee who would then 
pass it onto the gardaí and Dublin City Council.  
Relations began to build from there. Small committees based around one or two 
blocks of apartments or a few streets nominated representatives to attend the 
meetings of the CPF, which were held every three months. There is evidence that 
this particular forum has led to greater responsiveness on the part of gardaí and 
that their operations have become more transparent and open as a result (Connolly 
2002). Since gardaí know that they will be questioned publicly, they feel obliged to 
document what they have done about issues raised by the public.  A senior garda 
illustrated his point in the following way:  
there are issues across the North Inner City and we are asked, from the 
floor, what are we doing about it.  If we haven’t done something about 
it in the lead up to that meeting, than you can be sure it has to be done 
for the next meeting.  The community have given a ferocious tongue 
lashing if something is not done (Interview B). 
Some interviewees considered that individual gardaí have become more motivated 
to identify with particular areas as a result of this series of intensive meetings and 
regular encounters with particular individuals. The CPF in the North Inner City has 
been successful in terms of fostering a greater culture of transparency and 
collegiality, to the extent that it may cut off any sense of grievance. A police officer 
noted that he sometimes had to deal with allegations that officers had been ‘rough’ 
with particular individuals. He admitted that  
if someone did something wrong and said look I made a mistake here, 
it won’t happen again, the person involved is apologetic for it, that 
works.  We make mistakes, of course we make mistakes, you are 
dealing with criminals who are living in the area around there, you are 
going to have confrontation at various times (Interview B). 
This apparent readiness to let matters drop can be contrasted with the Garda 
Ombudsman Commission’s testimony that informal resolution of complaints 
through mediation between the complainant and garda has encountered 
difficulties. Up to 2008, 233 cases had been assigned to informal resolution while 
just one case had been successfully mediated (Garda Síochána Ombudsman 
Commission 2008b: 19). 
The Community Policing Forum can be seen to be a relatively successful model of 
engagement with citizens at a local level. It has proven to be more sustainable than 
previous attempts to build such a rapport.  Success has been partly due to the 
persistent work of full-time personnel who ensure that links are made and 
maintained between community, gardaí and Dublin City Council.  A similar initiative 
has been pursued in the central area of Dublin city without the employment of 
specifically dedicated personnel. Eight general forums have been established 
whereby community representatives meet with the gardaí every two or three 
months, who try and deal with their complaints. 
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Both the community and gardaí have benefitted from improved relations: the 
community now have a more responsive police service and the gardaí have been 
able to tap into confidential information derived from the community. Arrests often 
follow from ‘graft on the ground with the guards––someone said something to a 
Guard at a local community meeting’ (Interview B). The local area has benefitted 
from a reduction in overt drug-dealing and there are now less adversarial relations 
between much of the community and gardaí. However, a number of questions can 
still be raised about the functioning of the CPF.  
A significant issue is that in encouraging a greater responsiveness on the part of 
state services, people may overlook what part the community has to play in 
ameliorating a problem: ‘if something comes up the CPF will immediately come to 
Dublin City Council or the Garda to resolve the issue. The last people they look at 
are the community, they miss that part’ (Interview C). The interviewee went on to 
say that there could be a greater emphasis on capacity-building within the 
community, since it is the intervention of the community that ultimately ensures 
social problems do not get out of hand.  
Some of the interviewees noted that the Community Policing Forum was driven by 
issues of extreme concern. This was beneficial in the sense that it could serve to 
mobilise people but it could also incite a demand for an immediate response. One 
of the officials interviewed noted that gardaí will reassure local residents that ‘a 
place has been raided, persons arrested, drugs have been seized and the file is with 
the DPP’ (Interview B)––a classic law-enforcement response. This is just what the 
public want – ‘just give us more gardaí’ was one person’s assessment when asked if 
there were any shortcomings with the project.  
Other respondents sounded a more sceptical note about issuing such immediate 
responses to residents’ concerns: ‘we have put in CCTV and security doors, they 
[community representatives] push that from the point of view that the residents are 
looking for it – they feel it works, I don’t necessarily agree’ (Interview C). Malcolm 
Sparrow has argued that there is a tendency for police organisations, when alerted 
to a concentrated crime problem, to rely on one standardised response – what he 
termed ‘directed patrol’ – which means ‘flooding the particular area at the relevant 
times with uniformed patrols in order to suppress the ‘crime problem’ (Sparrow 
2008: 94).  According to Sparrow (a former police detective), the problem with this 
kind of approach is that it considers that the two most important dimensions of a 
problem are where and when it occurs even though geography and time may 
represent only ‘two of at least a dozen relevant dimensions’ (ibid.: 95). Other 
important dimensions might involve the nature of offending, the characteristics of 
victims, the modus operandi of criminal activity, the kinds of commodity attracting 
criminal behaviour, situational features like architecture and so on. Recounting a list 
of potentially relevant factors such as these is to emphasise Sparrow’s point that 
regulatory organisations should deal with problems at an intermediate level, 
between single incidents and a general category of harms. As this kind of mid-level 
problem-solving relies on a sustained analysis of why certain harms reoccur and on 
an understanding of the proximate causes of this phenomenon, it usually represents 
a departure from normal routines. While the North Inner City Forum improved 
relations between community and gardaí it is not clear if it facilitated the kind of 
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learning envisaged in the schema of triple-loop learning discussed in the first part of 
this report.   
4.4 Regulating for Continuous Improvement 
Whilst the work of the Community Policing Forum discussed above has been largely 
positive, it is important not to draw too many conclusions from it. Not enough 
people have been canvassed to allow us to say whether it is a truly representative 
picture; this would require a more in-depth study encompassing more interviews, 
especially with frontline personnel. Still, an initial assessment has to be largely 
positive as it has managed to instil a responsive and intensive form of accountability 
on behalf of the police toward the community, apparently building up a degree of 
learning by way of continuous feedback from the public. The idea that encouraging 
practitioners of human services to liaise and engage with the recipients of those 
services raises standards has become increasingly influential. According to this view, 
service users should be given more ‘choice and voice’ in order to raise standards 
(Programme for Government 2011). But the idea that allowing for more ‘voice’ from 
the public produces an upward shift in standards is not given unqualified support by 
the work of the Community Policing Forum as outlined. While it is the case that 
allowing for frequent forms of public engagement has facilitated a more 
harmonious relationship between public and police, it may have encouraged 
customary police responses – more patrols, more arrests, more prosecutions – 
regardless of whether these are appropriate or not. Of course, there will be times 
when a law-enforcement response is the most suitable — one of the interviewees 
instanced investigations into criminal gangs — but the issue is whether there is an 
over-reliance on this method. Furthermore, it may place the burden of response 
upon the police and Council rather than enquiring about the capacity and efficacy of 
a community response itself.  
Perhaps some of the problems of the kind of learning engaged by the Community 
Policing Forum is linked to the lack of double-loop learning conducted by the garda 
organisation in terms of the lessons that could be learnt from this case study of the 
North Inner City policing forum. Without any comparators in terms of policing 
responses to such issues as anti-social behaviour, it is difficult for those entrusted 
with running the CPF to envisage how they might do things differently.  Monitoring 
comparative performance and the utilisation of resources is an issue that the Garda 
Inspectorate has raised in one of its reports (2007: 27). 
In recent times, Garda Headquarters has been changing its management practices, 
which has involved devolving responsibility to regional commanders and ‘setting 
strategic targets and monitoring compliance’ (Garda Síochána Inspectorate 2011a: 
3). Prescriptive actions and key performance indicators are set out in three-year 
corporate strategy statements and annual policing plans. Progress is monitored on a 
monthly basis and management also conducts quarterly regional inspections. 
Information on crime incidents is available through the gardaí’s computer system 
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although it is admitted that less detailed information is available at the local level at 
which an entity like the Community Policing Forum operates (ibid.: 5).  
One problem with relying on instruments such as action plans and performance 
indicators is that they can pass over the concerns that might be of most concern to 
people in a particular locality. Certain problems or even crimes may not make it 
onto the register of official concern and therefore may not elicit an effective 
response. This has been one of the significant innovations of the Community 
Policing Forum, namely that it liaises with community representatives to enquire 
about what the community perceives as a problem. They are asked about ‘what do 
they see as problems, where is there an area we need to look and they will come 
back to me and that will go into my policing plan’ (Interview B). The point here is 
that the perspective is one of focusing on problems from the bottom up rather than 
‘specifying the overall agency performance, and dividing that up’ (Sparrow 2008: 
55). Following the former path helps to avoid a misalignment between major 
processes and leading problems.  But it is important to note that this act of 
engaging with the local community is only the first step; having noted their 
concerns, it is then necessary to ‘parse the risk’, as Sparrow puts it, which involves 
comprehending why an issue is so vexatious and what makes it so. This is why 
Sparrow puts so much prominence on drawing out the particular causal factors that 
underlie incidents causing concern. It is always tempting, as Sparrow warns and our 
own research testifies, to rush to an immediate response. There is no single or 
infallible path to success and devising solutions to entrenched problems is difficult. 
But it is here that Garda Headquarters might play a part in deciding which is the 
most suitable and effective response to the issues that vex citizens. 
Sabel and Simon (forthcoming) argue that what distinguishes innovative forms of 
service provision is a ‘distinctive form of monitoring’ that engages in ‘intensive 
scrutiny of individual cases to reveal systemic problems’. A clear example of this 
kind of monitoring is known as Quality Service Review (QSR), used in child welfare 
cases discussed in the Overview report. QSR involves a random selection of cases, 
which are then reviewed by a two-person team via assessment of all relevant 
documentation and interviews with appropriate persons. The cases are scored 
according to two sets of indicators, namely the well-being of the child and family 
and the capacity of professionals to devise appropriate plans and implement them. 
The final report lays down the scores and identifies and illustrates recurring 
problems. 
Undertaking a process like QSR is as much about norm elaboration as it is about 
compliance enforcement since goals such as child safety and family stability are 
indeterminate in the abstract (ibid.). One could say the same about many of the 
garda priorities that have been laid down by the Minister for Justice such as the 
stipulation that gardaí provide a policing service that meets the needs of local 
communities (see An Garda Síochána (2012) Policing Plan 2012). A process like QSR 
assists in establishing clear examples of what such goals might mean in concrete 
terms and how they might be achieved: for instance, how are the needs of the local 
community identified and best met. By elaborating apparent instances of successful 
practice, it is hoped that practitioners will gain guidance on how to instigate 
improvements. The regime that QSR oversees is not one of rigid rules to which 
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practitioners must comply but one in which rules are revised in light of emergent 
best practice, which is always open to review and hence change. Thus ‘rules serve 
accountability, not by constraining discretion, but by making the system 
transparent—and hence open to democratic appraisal and intervention (Sabel and 
Simon forthcoming). 
If one judges policing-related matters surveyed, from the perspective of a device 
like QSR, several matters become clear.  It is difficult for those involved in devising 
local responses to assess how well they are doing. Certainly, they can judge 
themselves on how responsive they are to local concerns but it is difficult, in the 
absence of a process like QSR, to formulate a yardstick by which these measures 
can be judged. This problem of single-loop learning is related to a deficiency at the 
second loop of learning, namely that the corporate management does not seem to 
practise a process like QSR that would both illustrate what rather indeterminate 
concepts like ‘community safety’ mean and how they can be achieved. There exist 
entities like the Professional Standards Unit, which could play this role but there is a 
tendency to define its role as one of ‘ensuring compliance and adherence to 
operational and administrative policies’ (Garda Síochána Inspectorate 2011a: 4) 
rather than elaborating what emergent best practice might look like and what rules 
might be revised in light of this — revision of the rules rather than compliance to 
them could be the most important feature in raising standards21.  And there does 
not seem to be sufficient linkage between the work of this body and organisations 
like the Garda Ombudsman Commission whereby the latter could analyse its own 
complaints data, examine what might be significant contributory factors and link 
with a body like the Professional Standards Unit to push through improvements.  
This relates to a possible failing at the level of the third loop of learning, namely that 
the linkages between the corporate body that is being regulated and the regulator 
itself that facilitates learning and continuous improvement may not be strong 
enough.  As stated, a body like GSOC might be too restricted to individual cases 
without enquiring into what might be the systemic causes of these incidents. The 
Garda Inspectorate might encounter the opposite kind of problem, namely that it 
looks at general policies and systems without being able to assess how they work 
out in practice. To take an example, in its third report the Inspectorate 
recommended that the gardaí develop ‘multifaceted solutions to local public order 
issues in conjunction with the joint policing committees’ (Garda Síochána 
Inspectorate 2007: 27). An Garda Síochána’s response has been that this 
recommendation has been fulfilled by being included as a strategic goal in the 
Annual Policing Plan (Garda Síochána Inspectorate 2011a: 9). There is no indication 
of how this proposal has actually been implemented on the ground with an 
assessment of what kinds of initiatives have been more or less successful.  
                                                          
 
21
  The Garda have developed a Lessons Learned Framework.  This six-stage process is intended to promote good 
practice by identifying where something is working well or where remedial action is needed.  It is not clear 
what its impact has been (An Garda Siochána Strategy Statement 2010—12). 
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Yet if third-loop learning is to occur, those entrusted with ensuring high standards 
need to prompt organisations’ ‘rigorous self-evaluation and investment in the 
search for appropriate solutions to regulatory problems’ (Gilad 2010: 502). This 
search requires organisations to detail how and why their interventions might have 
reduced harms and/or produced beneficial outcomes. This requires the kind of 
comparative approach alluded to above in our discussion of second-loop learning – 
it cannot be obtained through some sort of endorsement of some supposed best 
practice imported from elsewhere. High-quality regulation does not necessarily 
mean that the regulators pre-emptively try to specify what procedures the 
organisation in question should engage in; it would not make sense for the Garda 
Inspectorate to lay down what features ‘multifaceted solutions to local public order 
issues’ should contain. What the oversight body should be assessing is the 
organisation’s efforts to gain a fuller understanding of the kinds of procedures and 
systems that ameliorate an issue like disturbances to the public order so that both 
‘gradually develop a shared understanding of what good systems and outcomes 
look like’ (ibid.: 497). Presumably, the organisation would achieve relative successes 
in some areas and it should be the role of the organisational headquarters to probe 
why this is the case; it should be the role of whatever body is concerned with 
overseeing standards to examine whether similar successful strategies are emulated 
elsewhere within the relevant organisation. This learning-based approach to 
regulation does not preclude efforts based around external pressure and may well 
ultimately depend on it. It would add a normative dimension to this pressure by 
insisting that monitoring and self-evaluation are intrinsic to the ideal of the 
profession or work in question. Moral reinforcement is significant since research has 
shown that a disregard for and non-compliance with internal regulation can often 
be legitimised by perceptions that such work is secondary and alien to practitioners’ 
professional identities. By challenging recalcitrant attitudes with information about 
how personnel from the same organisation have changed their behaviours and 
practices as a result of internal self-regulation, oversight bodies may find that they 
can leverage a general improvement in standards. 
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Chapter 5 
Avoiding Extremes of 
Regulation to Enhance 
Policing 
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5.1 Introduction 
This chapter suggests that the new institutional architecture surrounding policing 
contains much greater potential for fostering change that is not being realised. But 
the way to actualise positive improvements may not lie in the solutions that are 
commonly sought. One school of thought would recommend giving a regulator like 
GSOC greater independence and investigative powers; another might advocate 
more intensive and regular liaison and consultation with communities at an even 
more devolved level through entities like the local police fora. By examining 
developments in policing through the lens of quality and regulatory models 
examined in the overview report, we have suggested that more ‘top-down’ and 
‘bottom-up’ approaches will not be successful. Rather the crucial question is how 
the various parts of the system interact or mesh with each other, leading to a more 
effective regulatory regime in general. 
The NESC project on quality, standards and accountability has sought to assess 
human services in Ireland using the concepts and models of regulation and 
continuous improvement that are studied internationally.  The Overview report 
draws attention to a number of themes: responsive regulation; a focus on, and 
involvement of, service users; devolution with accountability; and monitoring and 
learning (NESC, 2011). We briefly summarise how the Irish system of quality and 
accountability in policing looks on these dimensions before articulating a general 
conclusion about achieving improvements in the quality of policing. 
5.2 Responsive, Smart and Meta Regulation 
The idea of responsive regulation is to avoid the problems of both the command 
and control approach and pure self-regulation by modulating engagement and 
sanctions of the central authority depending on the performance and capability of 
the frontline provider.  It also involves an attempt to link a ‘regulatory pyramid’ with 
a ‘strengths-based pyramid’.  The developments of the past decade or more 
certainly move the Irish system in the direction of responsive regulation.  But the 
system does not yet contain some of the key characteristics of responsive 
regulation.  
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The idea of smart regulation was developed to capture the fact that, in many 
contexts, regulatory authorities recognise their own limits and engage a range of 
actors, often including the regulated entity, to perform and achieve regulatory 
goals.  At first sight, the current Irish policing system might seem like an example of 
smart regulation, given the multiplicity of actors and agencies involved in activities 
that shape the degree of quality and accountability, including the Garda Síochána 
Ombudsman Commission, Garda Síochána Inspectorate, Garda Professional 
Standards Unit, Joint Policing Committees and Local Policing Fora as well as the 
Department of Justice and Equality itself. Although the profusion of organisations 
involved in overseeing and improving the work of the gardaí might seem to indicate 
that there is a system of smart regulation at work, this is not necessarily the case. As 
was outlined in the overview report, it is not a multiplicity of parties per se that 
makes for smart regulation but an appropriate division of labour between them. 
And as has been demonstrated in this report, this division has not yet been 
achieved in the policing sector although it is being promoted by some of the 
relevant institutions. 
Achieving an appropriate division of labour would mean that the bonds between 
the oversight and consultative institutions are of sufficient quality to propel lasting 
progress; this would entail that their work should complement each other. But 
there is reason to believe that this might not be the case. Looking at the activity of 
investigating complaints, research is converging on the idea that oversight should 
concentrate on the causes of police misconduct, rather than just looking into the 
symptoms, that is complaints (see section 3.2). What this more diagnostic model of 
oversight often finds is that the causes of complaints often stem from ‘the failure of 
management to put in place good policies and procedures to govern officer 
conduct’ (Walker and Lorenz 2011: 23). A finding like this then makes it obvious why 
there should be evident linkages between an oversight body like GSOC and an 
internal review body like the GPSU, or between these two bodies and the Garda 
Inspectorate. Of course, it has been claimed that such linkages do exist, in that one 
body like the GPSU takes cognisance of the findings of others like GSOC or the 
Inspectorate. But this seems to occur at a relatively informal level without 
discernible signs of progress. This is not a failing peculiar to policing; there are many 
instances within the Irish policy system whereby networks are said to form but it is 
difficult to gauge the progress they have made.  
The idea that the various parts of the system need to cohere with each other is 
beginning to be articulated. For example, the Garda Ombudsman Commission has 
expressed a wish that a notion of a service complaint be introduced where a person 
is dissatisfied with the standard or level of service provided by the gardaí and which 
might be resolved by a frontline supervisor such as a sergeant rather than a 
superintendent (GSOC 2012). In effect, it is trying to move from a system based on 
direct regulation and toward one of meta-regulation in which it oversees frontline 
efforts to manage staff. Additionally, the Chairman of the GSOC has expressed his 
wish that the Commission work more closely with the Garda Inspectorate on issues 
that arise regularly in complaints so that they might form the basis of a wider 
review (The Irish Times, February 14th 2012). However, the former commissioners 
did express a regret that the process of making changes to the governing Act to 
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enable these kinds of changes has been ‘very slow’ (GSOC 2012: 23). This underlines 
the importance of some central node, such as a government department, with the 
network of oversight and consultative bodies assuming responsibility for overall 
coherence and efficacy of the regulatory regime. However, it would seem that 
discussions are now taking place between the Ombudsman Commission and the  
Garda Síochána with a view to advancing GSOC’s proposals regarding a speedier and 
less formal resolution of service-type complaints (Minister for Justice and Equality, 
Address to the Annual Conference of the Association of Garda Superintendents on 
the 18 April 2012). This development may portend the kind of linkages necessary for 
successful regulation. 
5.3 A Focus on, and Involvement of Service Users 
As we outline in our conceptual overview, the involvement of service users is an 
important factor in the development and application of standards for the provision 
of quality human services (NESC, 2011).  Irish policing has long been characterised 
by a high level of community satisfaction but in the overview report, we underline 
that it is a focus on service users, rather than stakeholder engagement per se, that 
characterises the new models of service provision. Intrinsic to this new model is a 
direct form of engagement rather than a representative one. This reflects the core 
fact that has motivated the development of these more focused approaches: 
people’s needs, and the contexts in which they seek to flourish, vary much more 
than was acknowledged in traditional systems of uniform population-wide service 
provision.  It is the variety of individual needs and contexts that warrants the key 
feature of the emerging world of services—the provision of ‘tailored’ or ‘person-
centred’ services. As is broadly recognised, Ireland has become a more diverse 
society and it has to cope with the issues that this throws up, from which policing is 
not immune.  
On one level, the advances in consultation achieved through entities like the joint 
policing committees could be seen as establishing representative mechanisms. But 
this representative mode of work may not be without problems as it may fail to 
engage with and resolve some of the issues that are troubling a community. A 
recent public consultation exercise conducted by the Department of Justice and 
Equality illustrated this issue. It elicited the observation that JPCs should not ‘just be 
a complaints forum (emphasis in original) but a body enabling an effective and 
active response to situations in the local community’ (Department of Justice 2011b: 
11), i.e. it should be as much concerned with the improvement of services as 
sustaining the accountability of those providing the service. This could be achieved 
by the development of key performance indicators for JPCs in consultation with the 
relevant local communities and taking account of local knowledge and the most up 
to date PULSE statistics [figures from the police database of recorded crime 
incidents] relating to the localities/ communities in question.  
What the representative model presumes is a particular model of accountability 
based upon the idea that the community expresses its wishes and the garda 
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organisation carries them out. However, a different kind of accountability, 
combined with a more devolved way of working may be needed to resolve some of 
the issues facing communities. 
5.4 Devolution with Accountability  
Policing traditionally had been based upon a hierarchical structure, which gave the 
appearance of tight control, but actually lent out a large amount of discretion to 
frontline personnel. In effect policing was based upon a large degree of devolution 
of powers with sporadic accountability. Whilst this gave serving policing officers the 
freedom to discharge their powers as they deemed suitable, it ran the risk of 
fostering possible inequities or even abuses, as demonstrated in the reports of the 
Morris Tribunal. After the Morris report, accountability was emphasised through 
the establishment of a range of oversight and consultative institutions. However 
this report has contended that the appropriate blend of devolution and 
accountability has not been delivered. In section 3.3, we recounted the Garda 
Inspectorate’s view that there was scope for greater devolution and in section 4.1, 
we noted the observation that the hierarchical structure of the organisation did not 
sit well with this less centralised way of working. It would seem that the structure of 
the organisation still dictates the form and content of models of devolution and 
accountability. 
Taking the latter notion of accountability first, this still seems to be dominated by 
compliance rather than performance concerns. This is to say that there is a great 
emphasis on ensuring that policies have been adhered to and that misdeeds have 
not been committed rather than performance being continually elevated and 
improved. Such a statement may seem unfair given the evident commitment of so 
many members of the An Garda Síochána which this report has underlined through 
the case study. But even here the report has made the point that devolving powers 
and responsibilities should make us rethink our notions of accountability: it is less 
about answering to some principal – be it a department, legislature or community – 
that its wishes have been carried out and more about exploring and exemplifying 
what it might mean to attain a goal like community safety. But in the case study, we 
demonstrated that this had not taken place. Despite the gardaí carefully attending 
to the community’s wishes – some form of devolution had been achieved - the 
report has argued that various problems may not have been adequately diagnosed 
and the solution thought through.  
If an emphasis is put on continuous monitoring and the uncovering of the root 
causes of incidents, then police officers would focus on problem-solving rather than 
rule-keeping or the disciplining rule-breakers. It could be said that problem-solving 
is what police officers have always done: they do not usually invoke their powers of 
arrest to restore social order but rely on their authority and intuition to work out 
how to calm a situation. But this way of working itself relies on an idea of the typical 
‘street-level’ bureaucrat who works at ground-level unencumbered by rules or 
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oversight. Whereas this report suggests that seeking to combine devolution with 
accountability modifies both concepts. 
Devolution is not just about granting greater freedom to practitioners to serve their 
communities as they see fit; it is also about balancing this level of discretion with a 
commitment to assess their efforts and impacts in light of similar endeavours 
elsewhere. Stressing this aspect of devolution changes how one might think about 
accountability. Rather than it being a ‘straight-line’ notion based around compliance 
with the express wishes of a principal, it is more akin to a mutual exploration of 
what the attainment of broad goals would entail. Balancing devolution with 
accountability means that the regime in question leave enough freedom for creative 
solutions that are congruent with the local context but have sufficient 
accountability to ensure appropriate consistency of outcomes. Achieving this kind of 
equilibrium requires that frontline personnel undertake monitoring of their 
solutions and the policy centre encourages these efforts and compares them to 
what is being undertaken elsewhere.  
5.5 Monitoring and Learning 
Suggesting that there should be regular monitoring and learning in the area of 
policing may seem inappropriate for a service that is often called upon to deal with 
emergency situations. Policing is, in the memorable phrase of one scholar, usually 
concerned with ‘something that ought not to be happening and about which 
someone had better do something now!’ (Bittner 1974: 30). In other words, policing 
is often called for in perceived emergencies, usually with the potential for social 
conflict.  Many police personnel and officers might think that there is little time and 
scope for monitoring or a considered response; rather they have to ‘do something 
now’. That a quick response is often called for is undeniable but this should not 
preclude a more measured reaction as well; otherwise the danger is that similar 
incidents will re-occur in the future and that the additional resources obtained from 
roster changes could be dissipated.  
However, it is not just those at the forefront of practice that need to undertake 
monitoring and learning; people at different levels need to do likewise so that 
learning is built on a series of successive loops. The Overview report endorses the 
idea of ‘triple-loop’ learning with the first loop signifying that frontline workers try 
to analyse what difference in outcome their intervention might have produced; the 
second loop concerns a corporate body reviewing the effects of similar initiatives 
around the country and revising practice in light of the lessons arising; and the third 
loop is completed when regulatory and oversight bodies review the self-monitoring 
of the organisation they oversee. This is repeating our earlier point about an 
appropriate division of labour between the variety of bodies involved in the system 
of policing. 
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5.6 Avoiding Extremes to Achieve Quality 
Debates about how to secure improvements in quality and standards are often 
polarised between two extremes. One option is to bestow greater investigative and 
sanctioning powers on a body that is separate from the entity being regulated; the 
other emphasises that frontline staff should be granted greater autonomy and 
initiative to make choices congruent with service users’ needs. Internationally, one 
can see this debate being played out in many human services including policing. 
Here in Ireland, a great deal of commentary has wondered whether GSOC is 
sufficiently independent of the garda organisation that it regulates, whereas in 
England and Wales proposals are being formulated for locally elected police Chiefs 
so that local people may have a greater say in how police services are operated.  
Hopefully, this report has made the case that quality and standards will not be 
achieved either through the simple addition of more top-down powers or greater 
bottom-up input. Emphasising formal, legal sanctioning powers alone does not work 
for a number of reasons. The number of incidents that fall under such powers are 
relatively small and open to dispute, and the most serious sanctions are the 
prerogative of the judiciary and not the Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission, 
which diminishes the certainty of sanctioning (a problem that many regulators 
encounter). In addition, many complaints come under the category of service issues 
that cannot be appropriately solved through a formal prosecutorial process. This 
might lead one to suppose that standards are better raised through some sort of 
bottom-up process and the evidence adduced in this report shows that there are 
some merits with this way of proceeding. Liaising directly with communities allowed 
the police to attend to community concerns, reassure citizens that they were being 
listened to and could resolve complaints quickly thus pre-empting a sense of 
grievance. However, it seemed that very often this bottom-up process could be 
isolated from what organisations with a national remit were doing so that 
opportunities to share and learn from experiences were being lost. Thus a key to 
any future reforms will not lie in augmenting either top-down or bottom-up 
processes but ensuring that that the two interact or braid with each other to 
produce higher standards than could be achieved through a single process.  
Some might think that there is a divide between those entities that formally oversee 
the work of An Garda Síochána and those that have a consultative role, and that 
issues of quality and standards pertain solely to the former and not the latter. But in 
keeping with one of the central tenets of a broad notion of responsive regulation, 
namely that ‘numerous actors influence the behaviour of regulated groups in a 
variety of complex and subtle ways, and that mechanisms of informal social control 
can often prove more important than formal ones’ (Gunningham 2010: 131), this 
report has analysed the role that community groups can play in raising standards. 
According to this model of regulation, we should focus our attention on broader 
regulatory influences and not just those institutions charged with explicit oversight.  
This would include internal management systems, as exemplified in the work of the 
Garda Professional Standards Unit, and the involvement of civil society in a ‘myriad 
of different forms’ (ibid.) through such associations as Joint Policing Committees 
and Local Community Fora.  Each of these organisations, and other besides, can act 
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as ‘quasi-regulators’ all of which should ideally work in tandem with each other to 
advance the quality of policing. 
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